REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
02-05-2001	Master of Military Studies Research Paper	September 2009 - April 2010

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
TITLE: Why Can't We Be Friends: Peace Corps and Military Cooperation in Africa

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
N/A

5b. GRANT NUMBER
N/A

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
N/A

6. AUTHOR(S)
Major Joseph C Novario

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
N/A

5e. TASK NUMBER
N/A

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
N/A

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
N/A

11. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
N/A

12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
N/A

14. ABSTRACT
Through the use of existing linkages with the US Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps and AFRICOM can cooperate to help the people of Africa create more stable governments. Because of challenges presented to the security of Peace Corps volunteers the cooperation must remain behind the scenes and through surrogate organizations. Working together, however, is the key to successfully building a long lasting partnership with African countries.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Peace Corps, Interagency, Whole of Governement, AFRICOM, US Agency for International Development, USAID,

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
			UU	29	Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPONE NUMBER (Include area code)
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass			(703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

WHY CAN'T WE BE FRIENDS? :
PEACE CORPS AND MILITARY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

MAJOR JOSEPH C NOVARIO

AY 10-11

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Jonathan F. Phillips
Approved: _____
Date: 27 April 2011
Oral Defense Committee Member: ERIC SHIBUYA
Approved: _____
Date: 27 April 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Why Can't We Be Friends? : Peace Corps and Military Cooperation in Africa

Author: Major Joseph Novario, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Using existing linkages at the US embassies, AFRICOM and USAID, among others, the military and the Peace Corps should complement each other's efforts in Africa.

Discussion: With the creation of AFRICOM and the establishment of their mission, it is clear that the focus for the military in Africa is toward stability and security and not toward fighting major wars. This includes cooperation with inter-agency partners as evidenced by the integrated command structure and partnership agreements with other government agencies such as the US State Department and the US Department of Agriculture. One of the key partnerships is with the US Agency of International Development. Like many COCOMs, AFRICOM maintains a USAID senior advisor on its staff. One agreement that could provide advantages to AFRICOM and African citizens is a partnership with the Peace Corps. The political independence of the Peace Corps presents challenges to this partnership. The Peace Corps has maintained independence throughout its existence which has ensured both access and security for its volunteers. African villagers understand that assistance from the Peace Corps comes with no strings attached and welcome them into the community and ensure their safety much like they do their own. This presents issues for open cooperation between the military and Peace Corps because of the skepticism surrounding US aims in Africa and the history of the military on the continent.

Conclusion: By using mutual partners such as USAID the military can support Peace Corps volunteers indirectly. The Peace Corps could ensure that AFRICOM civil military projects are appropriately directed and go to those in need.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE
VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY
PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Is interagency cooperation between the Peace Corps and military stretching the "whole of government" concept too far? After all, aren't the two at opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum? Don't their methods put them at such odds that any common goals the two share are compromised? Can these institutions change their attitudes toward each other? The Peace Corps, like many humanitarian organizations, fears that the military is treading dangerously close to its business. At the same time, military personnel are loath to closely work with and embrace the methods of civilian government institutions. Both ways of thinking inhibit interagency collaboration and limit the effectiveness of stability operations.

This essay examines how this philosophical divide impacts the effectiveness of stability operations on the continent of Africa and assesses the potential for and obstacles to greater collaboration between the recently-created Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Peace Corps. It argues that AFRICOM and the Peace Corps can complement each other's efforts in Africa without damaging the traditional culture or integrity of either, and that both institutions should use existing linkages with U.S. embassies and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to do so. In order to explore the opportunities for cooperation between the Peace Corps and AFRICOM, it is necessary to begin by examining the organizational structure and culture of both.

Previously divided between European Command and Central Command, the growing strategic importance of Africa caused President Bush to consolidate the region and place it under a new combatant command, AFRICOM, currently headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. From its genesis, AFRICOM would carry out the direction provided by President George W. Bush's comments made in February 2008 that the goal of AFRICOM is "...to support African leaders to

deal with African problems."[1] Unique aspects of the command make it perfectly suited for cooperation with the Peace Corps and other humanitarian organizations.[2]

From creation, AFRICOM was mandated to integrate the whole of government, interagency approach. Civilians are embedded throughout the chain of command and not just Department of Defense Civilians. At the very top, the four star Commanding General is supported by two deputies. The Deputy for Operations is staffed by a three star general. The other is the deputy for Civil Military Activities and is staffed by a Senior Foreign Service Minister Counselor. The other key position manned by a civilian, the Director for Outreach, coordinates strategic communication and partnering with African nations.[3] The command is also designed to have a number of non-DoD civilians throughout to enable the synergistic effects of interagency operations.

The goals of the command are focused on five key areas outlined in a speech from President Obama delivered in Accra, Ghana on July 11, 2009. Those five areas are democracy, opportunity, health, peaceful resolution of conflict, and to a lesser degree, addressing transnational challenges.[4] These focus areas are consistent with the aforementioned comments from President Bush and demonstrates the continuity in the direction provided to AFRICOM. The Commanding General, General William "Kip" Ward, lists four methods in his commander's intent issued in January 2010. With the exception of the vague catch all, "respond to crisis," the other three goals, building partner nation capacity, working with interagency and African partners, and addressing transnational challenges, all emphasize stability and development and not warfighting.

Much of the command is focused on civil military operations, military to military training and capacity building.[5] The Commanding General also made this clear in his January 2010 Commander's Intent. In it he states that AFRICOM will "prevent crisis rather than only react to it."[6] He does not mention combat or defeating the nation's enemies in this public intent, but again, only "respond to crisis as directed."[7] He has directed his command to focus on stability and security and not major combat operations. AFRICOM has executed a number of Civil Military programs, such as Exercise Med Flag, a joint Medical, Dental and Veterinary Action Program in Swaziland, which provides aid to local civilians and enhances the professionalism and popular support of the Swazi military. The command's Pandemic Response Program builds partner capacity in order to mitigate pandemics, and does so through close collaboration with USAID and Red Cross/Red Crescent. HIV/AIDS prevention and education is also a key part of AFRICOM's outreach mission. By providing education and testing for African military members and their families, AFRICOM and its interagency and NGO partners hope to decrease the HIV/AIDS plague that is affecting the continent.[8] Civil Military operations are integrated into almost every exercise and operation that AFRICOM executes.

In many respects, these humanitarian programs are enabled by partnering agreements with outside agencies. AFRICOM has these partnering agreements in place with a number of US government agencies and organizations. Among them are the State Department, the US Geological Survey Department, the Department of Energy, the US Department of Agriculture, and the Department of the Interior and the Transportation Security Administration.[9] Not mentioned in the list is USAID. The relationship between AFRICOM and USAID goes beyond partnering agreements to the degree that USAID places a full time senior member in the position of Senior Development Advisor on the AFRICOM staff. This commitment to having a USAID

member on the staff is shared by some of the other combatant commands, but the focus on development is pervasive throughout AFRICOM's public literature, policy and organization.

The fiscal year 2010 command posture provides priorities set forth by the command.[10]   The first priority for the current fiscal year is to support democracies and good governance. The second priority is fostering sustained economic growth. Increasing access to health care and education is the third priority. Fourth and final priority is the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of armed conflict. The command will meet these priorities through sustained security agreements.[11] These priorities are remarkably non kinetic. That is to say defeating enemies or winning the nation's wars does not appear even in coded language among them. AFRICOM is at the forefront of the execution of humanitarian and development missions by a military organization. This makes the command ready for cooperation with organizations like the Peace Corps, USAID, and other humanitarian governmental and Non Governmental Organizations. Through its deeds and partnerships, AFRICOM focuses on enhancing stability in Africa.

But within that focus lie the challenges for AFRICOM, chief among them are the skepticism from the people of the continent about its true aim and the command's desire to complete humanitarian and development projects though the traditional focus of the military is on waging war. Many in Africa are skeptical of AFRICOM. Especially considering the reality that recent actions in Africa, some before AFRICOM was established, contradict the policy aims stated above. An examination of actions taken by the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) illustrates this point. In 2006, the US supported the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. US policy at the time was focused on combating Islamic extremists and Somalia was a known haven.[12] CJTF-HOA became linked with these actions and consequently every other hard strike in the region. Since that time, CJTF-HOA has built in excess of 80 schools or clinics in Somalia.

For the locals, however, the kinetic actions overrode those developmental actions more recently taken.[13] Fortunately the local opinion of the US military is not as important as the people's support of local institutions. If AFRICOM continues to work through local African leadership it will have greater long term benefits for less cost than seeking support for the US military. As Peace Corps founder Sargent Shriver stated, a successful nation is the goal; states do not have to adopt the American way of life.[14]

M.A. Mohamed Salih, Professor of Politics of Development at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, further argues against military action in Africa. He points out that military security agreements have traditionally hurt African peoples well being and that they are rightfully skeptical of soldiers and the military. According to Salih, Africans need human security not military security. He defines this as food, job, and health security among other individual security needs that the people of Africa lack. [15] Military security alone will not bring lasting stability to Africa and therefore will not meet US strategic interests.[16] Although this is an argument against the use of military force to solve Africa's problems, it is not an argument against AFRICOM. Clearly, the priorities and intent published by the Commanding General focus on development and long term stability in the region. The challenge in the future will be access. To ensure that access, AFRICOM must be sure that its clandestine strikes and hard power is well coordinated with African governments. If it truly wants to conduct development projects and seek African solutions for African problems, it must be sure that consideration is given to long term relationship building. The Peace Corps certainly has that mindset and if the military can adopt the same, it too can benefit from positive relationships with African countries.

The skepticism surrounding the goal of AFRICOM is well founded. Traditionally, the US has focused on hard power and not soft power as the method of combating terrorism in the region.

African nations are not necessarily focused on controlling and ending terrorism.[17] They are focused on their own security priorities of ending hunger and disease and controlling ethnic warfare.[18] Convincing Africans and their leaders that the US wants them to succeed and not just help capture terrorists has been and will continue to be difficult. Add to this President Bush's 2000 campaign speech dismissal of Africa when he stated, "While Africa is important, it doesn't fit into US strategic interests as I see them."[19] It is not lost on Africans that this position changed after September 11th and it is fair to expect some level of skepticism about the US goals in Africa. The key to future success is continued presence and the reality that the military side of AFRICOM must not overshadow the nonmilitary foreign policy side.[20] Stronger links with humanitarian organizations, like those established between USAID and AFRICOM, will help to combat the militant image put forth in the past by US forces in Africa.

Further complicating the situation is the fact that recent developments have not helped AFRICOM and the US to establish a belief among Africans that stability and security are their aims. Among the 2010 leaked "wiki-leaks" documents were State Department cables sent from embassies back to D.C. One from Uganda relayed some considerable concern surrounding the opposition party in an upcoming election and states support for the incumbent. It delivers the message that the opposition party was politically immature and that it would not likely provide any improvements to governance.[21] Cables like this have spurred a rekindling of skepticism surrounding AFRICOM, USAID, and the United States in general. A follow on editorial to the cable leaking was titled, "Uganda: Should We Trust the US Envoy."[22] The cable and concern may be harmless communication, but taken from the perspective of Africans who have historic concerns about colonialism and foreign powers tinkering with African governments, it is another indicator of foreign meddling in internal democratic processes. This illustrates the skepticism

Africans have for the US and the careful line AFRICOM must walk to achieve real credibility as an organization hoping to provide stability and security and not just hunt terrorists. An effective way to convince Africans that AFRICOM is not a continuation of what they have grown so skeptical of, is to empower and work through those organizations that have always had the best interests of Africans in mind. AFRICOM should take measures to empower organizations that have earned the trust of the African people through years of cooperation; institutions such as the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps has fifty years of experience working with the people of Africa; a proud history that started with an idea late in 1960.

Counter to the "peacenik" stereotype associated with the Peace Corps, it was a politician with military experience and a career military man who collaborated to conceive of the Peace Corps. Future President John F. Kennedy provided the first hint of the Peace Corps when he asked students at the University of Michigan on October 14th, 1960, "How many of you would be willing to spend 10 years in Africa or Latin America or Asia working for the US and working for freedom?"[23] These and other words delivered that day are celebrated as the genesis for the Peace Corps. It would prove to be a peaceful alternative to the foreign policy that the country had become accustomed to and that its young people would rebel against in the coming decade. Retired General James Gavin, the President of the Arthur D. Little Company for consulting educators and educational organizations, made a similar declaration independent of Kennedy.[24] In an October 27th speech to 200 college presidents and 200 heads of corporations, General Gavin stated, "I think we can do better than to send our young men around the globe to watch over other societies in military uniform. I know many young men who would rather do something more ennobling for their country."[25] Gavin proposed that talented individuals from the US could fill educational and technical needs in other countries. After the speech his ideas

were communicated through aids to Kennedy and momentum for the Peace Corps grew.[26] It was not long after this that JFK gave his famous Cow Palace speech and made his promise for a "national peace agency" to provide hope to those who were "discouraged at the examples that we read in the *Ugly American*".[27] Kennedy was elected and within a year the Peace Corps was reality.

From the beginning the Peace Corps was an opportunity to serve abroad for those who rejected military service. Within this foundation lies both promise and difficulty for future cooperation. Perhaps this marked a key point in the divergence between two subcultures of the population: those who wished to continue to protect the peace by preparing for war and those who wanted to strengthen peaceful cultures in the hopes of avoiding war. The sentiment of the peaceful way is perfectly expressed by David Crozier in a letter to his parents in 1962. "Should it come to it I had rather give my life trying to help someone than to give my life looking down a gun barrel at them."[28] David proved to be the first Peace Corps Volunteer to give his life when he died during a plane crash that year. Sargent Shriver, the first Peace Corps Director, was insistent that the military and Peace Corps keep their distance. He wanted to be sure that the military "civic action" teams did not carry out projects in the Third World which would, in his mind, blur the line between military units and the Peace Corps.[29] This was also a time when containing communism was at the front of the minds and the foreign policy in the US. Communist countries were training teachers and others to spend their lives spreading their ideology.[30] When considering any divides between the military and Peace Corps, it is important to consider that the Peace Corps was founded as an anti communist organization.[31] The Peace Corps, however, is not considered part of the US foreign policy apparatus because it does not push the agenda of American politicians, but rather seeks stability throughout the world and

understanding among its peoples.[32] This is not inconsistent with current counter insurgency doctrine, but in the minds of Africans there are obstacles that will take time to overcome. As noted, the mission and priorities of AFRICOM do align with the mission of the Peace Corps and do aim to provide stability and understanding that will help to prevent future conflicts in the region. Any incongruence between the cultures of the organizations is muted by the clear alignment of their goals.

The Peace Corps mission continues to be defined by its three goals. The first is to help the people of interested countries by providing trained men and women. Second is to help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the people served. The third goal is to help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans.[33] It meets these goals by organizing volunteers into six core areas: education, health and HIV prevention, business development and information technology, environment, agriculture, and youth and community development.[34] Volunteers seek out projects based on need with no consideration for political value and, instead of seeking those in powerful positions to influence; the Peace Corps volunteer puts a priority on establishing person to person contact.[35] Shriver stated that the Peace Corps was "seeking not the support of these nations, but their success."[36] This approach certainly continues to be applicable today. The success and stability of nations is a high priority in a world where a failed state can be as dangerous as a strong one. It is also important to consider the impact a volunteer could have on a village's collective view of the US, the second goal mentioned above. After all, a violent anti US extremist would find difficulty seeking refuge in a village that had been reached by a Peace Corps volunteer. Many create bonds for life that are deep rooted and more loyal than a thirty day school building Civil Military Operation could hope to create.

The Peace Corps does this despite a relatively small requirement for funds or manpower. It had a budget of $400 million in 2010 and has nearly 200,000 total volunteers in its history with 7600 of them serving in seventy seven countries today. Thirty seven percent of those current volunteers serve in Africa.[37] The Peace Corps currently covers twenty eitght of the countries in Africa and has had a presence in all but seven over the course of its fifty year history.[38] Minimum age for a volunteer is the same as that for military service, eighteen, with no maximum age. Amazingly, ninety two percent hold at least an undergraduate degree, a key indicator that the first goal of providing trained men and women is being met. Each volunteer serves a twenty seven month term in country with the first three months dedicated to training.[39] A volunteer's life can be austere and, at times, lonely. The decentralized nature of the organization shows in the autonomy afforded volunteers. They file semiannual project status reports to the country director that are used for budgeting and overall goal analysis, but these are the only reports required of them.[40] By law Peace Corps country directors or deputy directors are required to visit each volunteer twice annually.[41] These factors combine to create a unique experience which gives the volunteer a perspective on the culture and personality of a village. This cultural knowledge could be mined to enable others to better understand a situation and culture of specific tribes or villages.

Much like the military, Peace Corps volunteers have a shared experience that begins in training. Volunteers are indoctrinated in the Peace Corps, and specifically trained for their country, which bears resemblance to the military indoctrination provided at basic training. Both organizations believe in team building and the importance of organizational culture and pride. For the Peace Corps, training is specifically developed to build camaraderie, survival skills and provide cultural education through immersion.[42] The total immersion comes in the form of

community based training. Volunteers spend three months within a community at one or a number of host family residences. From this location they receive training, seminars, shots and other preparation all while living amongst the population.[43] The training is decentralized and management is delegated to each country's coordinator which can cause the experience to differ slightly depending on the country. This cultural immersion has the desired effect of indoctrinating and challenging the trainee, but it also teaches an important lesson that the Peace Corps has brought forward through the last fifty years. Shriver relays this lesson, "... nor is our objective discomfort for discomforts sake, but rather a willingness to share the life of another people, to show that material privilege has not become the central and indispensable ingredient in an American's life."[44] This lesson continues to be learned throughout a volunteer's term as they continue to live among the people and do not enjoy life any better than those around them. Another aspect of training specifically aimed at volunteers headed for Africa is HIV/AIDS prevention. Regardless of which of the six core specialties a volunteer falls under, each receives extensive HIV/AIDS awareness training in order that they may educate the people of the country where they will serve.[45] Much like AFRICOM, the Peace Corps realizes the critical situation presented by HIV/AIDS in Africa.

The independence and isolation described above does create some concern for the safety and security of volunteers. In the years immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Peace Corps and Congressional leaders reviewed the measures in place. The Peace Corps took the measure of creating an Office of Safety and Security in early 2002. This included more than 70 new positions located in the field as part of the Peace Corps country team that provides support to volunteers.[46] Given the concerns that Americans could be targeted simply for being Americans, this new office emphasized safety and security of isolated volunteers. Typically,

Peace Corps employees, whether part of a staff or a volunteer, are limited to five years total service in the organization. The creation of the Office of Safety and Security was matched by Congress authorizing some positions to remain past that five year ceiling.[47] This is critical to the continuity of the safety and security infrastructure and a key indicator of the importance of volunteer safety.

Despite the creation of this new office focused on safety, the Peace Corps' key to providing a safe location for volunteers is community integration. This philosophy involves community acceptance of volunteers.[48] Peace Corps Regional Recruiter Erin Mone Marquez stressed that not only was acceptance by the local government and people important, but placement of volunteers also requires an invitation from the country. According to her, in some cases when the Peace Corps leaves a country it is because that country has asked the volunteers to leave due to security concerns and not necessarily the US "pulling out."[49] This was likely the case in some Muslim countries following September 11th, but the Peace Corps Volunteers were asked to return by 2004. This focus on country approval and community integration has worked. In a global survey taken by the Peace Corps of current volunteers, 97 percent of respondents felt they were adequately to very safe where they lived and 99 percent were adequately or very safe where they worked.[50]

The Peace Corps also publishes an annual report on the safety of volunteers with the most recent being published in 2008. This report indicates that volunteers are very safe. Of the nearly 8000 volunteers in service, only 1573 crimes were reported with 80 percent of those crimes being theft, robbery, or burglary. Only 37 aggravated assaults were reported and most of these involved alcohol consumption and did not require medical attention. There were also 22 rapes reported during the year.[51] Considering the youth of volunteers and the independence they are

afforded, these statistics are hardly alarming. A recent Peace Corps Director also stated during Congressional testimony that there are no regional or ethnic patterns to health and safety threats to volunteers. This included Muslim countries.[52] There did not appear to be any threats from violent extremists, but reports did not track terrorist attacks or other politically motivated targeting.

This focus on safety and security is at the forefront of everything the Peace Corps does. In the fiscal year 2010 annual report published by Peace Corps Director Aaron Williams, he states, "Keeping our volunteers safe and healthy is our top priority every day."[53] According to Mone Marquez, extraordinary assessments and security measures are taken. A comprehensive infrastructure evaluation takes place before volunteers are placed.[54] Mone Marquez also served with a number of NGOs in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan and compared the security emphasis between the two. In her estimation there is a much greater emphasis on security in the Peace Corps. At times she felt the NGOs were willing to operate in more threatening circumstances.[55]

Many of the Peace Corps Volunteers and returned volunteers stated that security would likely be the biggest challenge to openly operating with the military, especially in Africa where the military is often viewed with fear because of a history of colonialism and military coups. The military would certainly provide security while present, but once the military left the volunteer would not likely be integrated in the same holistic manner and the protection normally granted a fellow tribe or village member may not be so easily regained. Many are looked upon as spies or political operatives until they earn the respect of those they wish to help. Safety and Security of volunteers is not an area suited for cooperation between the Peace Corps and AFRICOM. As shown above, the Peace Corps does not need it because they have acceptable methods in place by which to provide it.

The idea of the Peace Corps volunteering in a country that the United States is currently at war with is wrought with difficulty as well. Both the political complication and the security concerns for the individual doom any idea for placing volunteers. Shriver also made this clear when President Lyndon Johnson favored the use of the Peace Corps in these countries. Shriver opposed him and insisted that volunteers would never go into a country which was actively at war with the United States.[56]

Not all volunteers took this view. In a July 2003 article written by a returned Peace Corps Volunteer to Morocco, Avi Spiegel argues for the Peace Corps to operate in more risky situations. He states that better relations between the military and the humanitarian world would improve access for volunteers. Instead of removing volunteers at times of great need, like those experienced by civilians during military conflict, the Peace Corps should not be so "gun shy." The lack of humanitarian organizations during war requires that the military handle those humanitarian issues. He also argues that leaving Muslim countries during recent extremism and misunderstandings between Americans and Muslims only increases the likelihood that hatred and animosity will reign.[57] This article was written in the wake of the Peace Corps exit from Jordan and Morocco. Volunteers have since returned to these countries. His point is well made, but to cooperate with the military the Peace Corps does not need to operate in war zones or risky environments. Also, the military cannot provide long term security for volunteers in a war zone. NGOs and other government agencies can accomplish this mission and work within the security apparatus provided by the US and other militaries without risking the long term reputation and security of the Peace Corps. In fact, that reputation is credited by one volunteer as the reason she received mercy. Mary Lopez, a returned volunteer to Benin, credited the Peace Corps reputation with saving her life. She was trapped in Congo for nine days by Rwandan rebels. Because these

rebels had a positive experience with the Peace Corps in the past, they spared this woman's life.[58] The rebels held the Peace Corps in high regard and likely understood the lack of political motive and lack of threat the volunteer posed. This story is from the perspective of the volunteer, but it is credible and provides evidence that the people of Africa hold the Peace Corps in high regard.

Improving access in Muslim countries is a high priority for the Peace Corps as it is for AFRICOM. Among the mandates of the Peace Corps Charter of the 21st Century, which was published by Congress in 2003, is renewed focus on the Muslim world. It directed to the Peace Corps the development of a strategy for expanding the presence in Muslim nations. It also recognized the Peace Corps as a great influence on a young generation of Muslims.[59] According to former Peace Corps Director Gaddi Vasquez, there was no increase in crimes or threats in those countries with 40 percent or greater Muslim population after September 11th and a number of those countries opened after September 11th to include Chad on the African continent.[60] Chad has since closed, but the Peace Corps has influenced the population there and is poised to do so in the future. Working in Muslim countries continues to be a top priority. Twenty two percent of current volunteers work in Muslim countries covering 40 percent of those countries throughout the world.[61] Coverage in North Africa is limited, but the focus and mindset of the Peace Corps is pushing toward greater representation there.

One critical aspect, and possible obstacle to working with AFRICOM, is the Peace Corps' political independence. When it was announced on May 4th, 1961, the Peace Corps was established as an autonomous government agency, which was key for recruiting those individuals who wanted to find another way to aid the world and spread the good will of Americans.[62] This was reinforced in 1980 with the update to the Peace Corps Act in section 2501-1, maintaining the Peace Corps as an Independent Agency.[63] This continues today with the

Congressional Subcommittee for Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs pushing to ensure that the Peace Corps maintains its independence and not be unduly influenced by politics. The committee wrote language into the Peace Corps Charter of the 21st Century Act in 2004 to ensure continued independence to preserve credibility and acceptance of volunteers.[64] Sargent Shriver began this insistence on a separation from US and world politics. On 15 December, 1963 he stated that "The fact that a country might vary back and forth from friendly to not so friendly should not mean we move the Peace Corps in and out like an accordion."[65] The Peace Corps should not be a carrot dangled for other countries to get in line with the United States, politically. As previously mentioned, the Peace Corps does not aim to cause countries or their people to adopt our way of life, but rather that they be a stable and successful nation. This has been a concept adopted recently by the US military, and especially AFRICOM. Military to military engagement, Civil Military Operations and partner nation capacity building all have aims at making foreign nations successful and stable.

This avoidance of politics has arguably ensured access by Peace Corps Volunteers and provided for their security, but it does not prohibit the Peace Corps from cooperating with other government agencies. In 2010 the Peace Corps strengthened cooperative agreements with the Department of State, the Millennium Challenge Account, and USAID through five new interagency agreements.[66] It also recently accepted $1 million from the Department of State for energy projects specifically aimed at mitigating climate change.[67] In the United States, climate change is a highly politicized topic. The Peace Corps even went so far as to host a forum of young African leaders focused on Civic Engagement in August of 2010. This forum was part of President Obama's initiative to link African leaders with US leaders.[68] If the Peace Corps can accept money for climate change and host a forum associated with President Obama's desire to

help African leaders, it can hardly claim that it is an apolitical organization. These relationships are indicative of opportunities for an increased relationship with the US military without jeopardizing the Peace Corps' good standing amongst the populations they serve.

Beyond the government infrastructure, both the military and the Peace Corps work closely with nongovernment aid organizations. Many Peace Corps volunteers have enjoyed excellent cooperation and relationships with NGO aid organizations as well as government aid organizations. The Peace Corps does not discourage working with these organizations and allows a synergy between the volunteers and NGOs to exist.[69] The Peace Corps has also developed an organization to allow returned volunteers to continue to provide assistance after they have completed their 27 month assignment. The Crisis Corps, which changed its name to the Peace Corps Response in 2007, was founded to mobilize returned volunteers to aid in response to natural disasters and other immediate humanitarian assistance emergencies.[70] The Peace Corps Response has provided assistance to 18 African countries since it was created in 1996.[71] Operating in much the same way as traditional NGOs and military humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief efforts, coordination between this force of returned volunteers and AFRICOM would be essential to improving response and aid in recovery. Furthermore, it would not jeopardize the relationship of the volunteer and the local community because the response force is short term. Coordination of these efforts in the chaos of a disaster can be difficult, but a lack of coordination, or worse, an unwillingness to coordinate, leads to a lack of support for those in need.

So, can AFRICOM and the Peace Corps cooperate in order to build a better future for AFRICA? The standard arguments to cooperation have been rebutted herein. Still change is difficult and can be threatening. Ultimately, cooperation between two organizations with the

same goal leads to both becoming more effective and efficient. The traditional obstacles associated with interagency cooperation such as competition for funding or semantic arguments about methods and mission statements have become frustrating excuses. Continuation of the current modus operandi in Africa will lead to continued stumbling by AFRICOM and a lack of resources for the Peace Corps. Stereotypes labeling Peace Corps volunteers as tree hugging hippies and military men as warmongering hawks have been proven false. Many in the Peace Corps have a keen interest in international politics beyond a utopian ideal of a global commune. Likewise, it is far more likely that a military member will conduct a humanitarian project than combat operations. It is likely that both Peace Corps volunteers and the military would be surprised to find that the similarities in not only their missions but also their methods are more numerous than the differences, especially in Africa.

The similarities in mission are on display in the Philippines where Peace Corps and military cooperation has led to success before. In the Philippines, the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) has worked with the Peace Corps to leverage an educator enrichment program where the Peace Corps provides instruction to a group of Filipino teachers that were identified by JSOTF-P Civil Affairs teams in Mindanao. The program was coordinated within the embassy by the members of JSOTF-P and the embassy team.[72] The precedent for successful cooperation exists in this example. When the goals of the two organizations were aligned and coordinated with the embassy, the benefits of cooperation became clear.

The Peace Corps and AFRICOM do share the same goals and increasingly some of the same methods to accomplish them. Some differences exist in scope, but seeking stability and security are at the root of both end states. Integrating each organization's training could be the first area to cooperate and coordinate between members. The Peace Corps has a vast knowledge of the

culture of regions within African countries. Cultural education from a returned volunteer could provide AFRICOM with understanding of the intricacies of tribes within the continent. . Looking for opportunities to embed these Peace Corps experts into the staff at AFRICOM could be a method. Simply hiring a returned volunteer for a short term contract to provide training prior to an exercise or operation could also be a method. Mining the Peace Corps database of returned volunteers and contracting an individual to provide cultural awareness training to military units before and during deployments to Africa would provide great benefit to AFRICOM and allow returned volunteers to continue to help the country they served in. Coordination with the Peace Corps for the purchase of returned volunteer after action reports would help both organizations as well. Paying returned volunteers for a cultural assessment document upon return would provide money to aid in the transition of returned volunteers and provide snapshots to planners within AFRICOM.

The military could also provide training to Peace Corps volunteers. Unexploded ordnance and land mines littered across Africa are serious threats to both volunteers and the villagers they serve. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 1998 report three of the top nine mined countries are located in Africa.[73] This list does not include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Mozambique, which all have more recent land mine related warfare and would undoubtedly make the list were a more recent survey conducted. AFRICOM could coordinate with Peace Corps training staffs in each country to provide land mine and unexploded ordnance identification training and awareness to Peace Corps volunteers and to local villagers. Using a "train the trainer" method, AFRICOM could quite easily empower volunteers to provide for the safety of African people. Both organizations are focused on the prevention and eradication of AIDS on the continent as well. Coordination and shared training methods would ensure efforts

between the Peace Corps, AFRICOM, and the governments in Africa are complimentary and not duplicative.

The key to sustained coordination and cooperation between the Peace Corps and AFRICOM lies with USAID. The United States Agency for International Development was founded around the same time as the Peace Corps and came from the same spirit. Today, the USAID has programs in place to work with Peace Corps Volunteers. One of these is the Small Project Assistance Program (SPA). This program is enabled by an interagency agreement between USAID and the Peace Corps and ranges across the six core sectors in which volunteers work. Through this program volunteers can nominate small "self-help" style projects for funding through USAID.[74]

USAID cooperation with the military is mandated by law and internal agency policy. Guidelines for USAID cooperation with the military are set forth in the July 2008 USAID Civil Military Cooperation Policy. It stresses that USAID maintains lead for development and stresses the importance of cooperation. It also stresses the "3D" approach to foreign policy: Defense, Diplomacy and Development. The policy explains the role of the Department of Defense in development by referencing DoD Directive 3000.05.[75] This directive states that "stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations."[76] It is clear that USAID enjoys a solid, sustainable relationship with both AFRICOM and the Peace Corps and can serve as a link between the two.

Acting as a link between AFRICOM and the Peace Corps, USAID is positioned to be the broker that enables better cooperation. Providing funding for projects and assistance through the

SPA program provides much needed support to Peace Corps Volunteers. USAID advises and assists the military in planning and providing humanitarian assistance and development. These development projects need a solid foundation in place to provide the best stability. Building a school or a clinic in an area where school teachers and doctors are not available is counterproductive. What happens to these buildings after the military leaves? Are they put to good use or simply left to be used by squatters or striped of anything of value? Peace Corps volunteers, some of whom are experts in education and health, have a need for these schools and clinics and identify those needs to USAID. Surely having AFRICOM provide that infrastructure would not harm the relationship between the volunteer and his community. Furthermore, typical civil military projects are completed alongside local government officials. Villagers who are assisted in this way by their local government would develop a connection to the legitimate leaders and would be less likely to support insurgent efforts to recruit or control them. The volunteer could then ensure that the new building, or road, or water well was used properly and provided the appropriate benefit, not just by an informed assessment and request process, but also by remaining at the location long after the military humanitarian team has left. The perfect scenario can be envisioned wherein the Peace Corps volunteer identifies the needs, the military is given a worthwhile project upon which to spend budgeted development dollars, and the local government gets the credit, none of which is harmful to the reputations of the organizations involved.

This coordination and cooperation is the key to the whole of government approach to solving these problems. The United States owes it not only to the taxpayer, but also to the people of Africa to make sure the efforts it puts forth are well coordinated and most effective. Putting aside historic differences or perceived cultural divides between US agencies is necessary to meet

that end. Cooperation need not go beyond what makes sense for both organizations and for the people of specific locations. Overarching policy that mandates cooperation is not necessary. Instead organic, grass roots programs will lead the way. If a village would benefit from Peace Corps cooperation with AFRICOM, then it should happen. Without better cooperation and an opening of minds beyond stereotypes, support for Africa will continue to stumble forward with no hope to accomplish the mission for any of the players involved. Interagency synergy provides an opportunity to do something better than if it had been done alone.

---

[1]   U.S. Africa Command Website, "Bush Discusses Goal of Africom", Feb 20 2008, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1651 (accessed 10 March 2010).

[2]   Although the command was activated on October 1, 2008 and is barely two years old, it has made a number of initial impressions that will allow some evaluation. Reactions to its creation and actions of the US military in Africa, both before and after, give a reasonable reflection of the command.

[3]   AFRICOM Website, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Org%20Chart.pdf (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[4]   President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament in Accra, Ghana, Delivered July, 11 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/ (accessed 9 Jan 2010).

[5]   AFRICOM 2010 command posture, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf, 26-29. (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[6]   AFRICOM 2010 commanders intent, http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/ Commander%27s%20Intent%20January%202010.pdf (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[7]   AFRICOM 2010 commanders intent.

[8]   AFRCOM Command Posture, 30-31.

[9]   AFRICOM Command Posture, 38.

[10]   It is important to note that these are the public priorities much like the commander's intent is public. It is possible that a classified or more closely held list of objectives exists, though they are not likely to differ in spirit.

[11]   AFRICOM Command Posture, 4.

[12]   Robert Berschinski, AFRICOM's Dilemma. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 43-44.

[13]   Berschinski, 44.

[14]   Sargent Shriver, "The Peace Corps Strength," The Peace Corps, ed.Pauline Madow (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1964), 159.

[15]   M.A. Mohamed Salih, "An African Perspective on Security", U.S. Strategy in Africa, ed. David J. Francis (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 78-91.

[16]   David J. Francis, "Conclusion", U.S. Strategy in Africa, ed. David J. Fransic (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 177.

[17]   Berschinski, vi, 1-4.

[18]   Berschinski, 10-11

[19]   Berschinski, 4.

[20]   Francis, "Conclusion", *US Strategy in Africa*, 175-176.

[21]   New Vision Online, http://www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?newsCategoryId=12&newsId=740660 (accessed 2 Jan 2010).

[22]   New Vision Online.

[23]   Coates Redmon, *Come As You Are: The Peace Corps Story* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 4.

[24]   Redmon, 14-15.

[25]   Redmon, 15.

[26]   Redmon, 15-18.

[27]   Redmon, 19.

[28]   Gerald T. Rice, *The Bold Experiment* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 256.

[29]   Rice, 265.

[30]   Redmon, 19-20.

[31]   Rice, 256.

[32]   Rice, 256-258.

[33]   Peace Corps website, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=about.mission (accessed 10 Oct 2010).

[34]   U.S. Peace Corps, *Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010* (Washington, DC: Peace Corps Headquarters, 2010), 3.

[35]   Rice, 265.

[36]   Sargent Shriver, *The Point of the Lance*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 25.

[37]   U.S. Peace Corps, *Peace Corps fast facts sheet*, http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/about/pc_facts.pdf (accessed 10 Oct 2010).

[38]   Peace Corps Website, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn.wherepc.africa. (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[39]   Peace Corps fast facts sheet.

[40]   Dillon Banerjee, *The Insider's Guide to the Peace Corps,* 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Ten Speed Press, 2009), 115-116.

[41]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security of Peace Corps Volunteers*, 108th Cong., 2d sess., June 22, 2004, 28.

[42]   Redmon, 114-121.

[43]   Banerjee, 38.

[44]   Sargent Shriver, "The Peace Corps Strength," *The Peace Corps*, ed.Pauline Madow (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1964), 159.

[45]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 5.

[46]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 3.

[47]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 4.

[48]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 8.

[49]   Erin Mone Marquez, telephone conversation with author, 23 November, 2010.

[50]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 9.

[51]   U.S. Peace Corps Office of Safety and Security, *Safety of the Volunteer 2008*. Washington, DC: Peace Corps Headquarters, 2008. http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/volsafety2008.pdf (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[52]   Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security*, 27.

[53]   *Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report*, 16.

[54]   Interview with Erin Mone Marquez on 23 November, 2010. According to Mone Marquez the Peace Corps operates under a different name in China in order to protect volunteers and the program. They are known as US-China Friendship Volunteers. This name most likely has a connection to heightened political sensitivities as well as security.

[55]   Interview with Erin Mone Marquez on 23 Nov 2010.

[56]   Rice, 267.

[57]   Avi Spiegel, "Send in the Peace Corps," *NYTIMES.com*, July, 23, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/23/

opinion/send-in-the-peace-corps.html (accessed 21 Nov 2010).

[58] Personal correspondence with Mary Lopez, returned volunteer to Benin (93-95) and Dem Rep of Congo (98).

[59] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, *The Peace Corps,* 107th Cong. 2nd Sess., June 25, 2002, 3.

[60] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Assessing the Safety and Security,* 26.

[61] *Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,* 24.

[62] Redmon, 41-42.

[63] U. S. General Counsel, *The Peace Corps Act,* Passed on April 15, 1998, 2.

[64] Senate Hearing *The Peace Corps,* 2002, 13-15.

[65] Rice, 259.

[66] *Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,* 15.

[67] *Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,* 29.

[68] *Peace Corps Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,* 10.

[69] Banerjee, 117.

[70] Senate Hearing *The Peace Corps,* 2002, 11.

[71] Peace Corps website, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=resources.returned.response. countriesserved   (accessed 17 Dec 2010).

[72] Personal correspondence on 29 March 2011 with Colonel William Coultrup, USA, formerly of JSOTF-P.

[73] Unicef.org. http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/hidekill.htm (accessed 2 Jan 2010).

[74] USAID Website, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/ index.html (accessed on 17 Dec 2010).

[75] U.S. Agency for International Development, *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy,* (Washington DC: USAID), 1-4.

[76] U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations,* Directive 3000.05, September 16, 2009, 2.

Bibliography

AFRICOM 2010 Command Posture. http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/
   USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf. (Accessed 17 Dec 2010).

AFRICOM 2010 Commanders Intent. http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/
   Commander%27s%20Intent%20January%202010.pdf. (Accessed 17 Dec 2010).

AFRICOM Website. http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644. (Accessed 20 Dec
   2010).

AFRICOM Website. http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Org%20Chart.pdf.
   (Accessed 20 Dec 2010).

Banerjee, Dillon. *The Insider's Guide to the Peace Corps,* 2nd ed. Berkeley: Ten Speed Press,
   2009.

Berschinski, Robert. *AFRICOM's Dilemma.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.

Francis, David J. "Conclusion." In *U.S Strategy in Africa.* edited by David J. Francis. London
   and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Kennedy, John F. "A Permanent Peace Corps." In *The Peace Corps,* edited by Pauline
   Madow, 158-164. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1964.

New Vision Online. http://www.newvision.co.ug/detail.php?newsCategoryId=
   12&newsId=740660. (Accessed 10 Jan 2011).

Obama, Barack, Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament in Accra, Ghana. Delivered July,
   11 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-
   Ghanaian Parliament// (Accessed 9 Jan 2010).

Peace Corps fast facts sheet. http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/about/
   pc_facts.pdf. (Accessed 10 Oct 2010).

Peace Corps website, http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=about.mission. (Accessed 10
   Oct 2010).

Peace Corps Website. http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn.wherepc.africa.
   (Accessed 17 Dec 2010).

Peace Corps Website. http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn.wherepc.asia.china.
   (Accessed 20 Dec 2010).

Redmon, Coates. *Come As You Are: The Peace Corps Story.* San Diego, New York, London:
   Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, 1986.

Rice, Gerald T. *The Bold Experiment.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.

Salih, M.A. Mohamed. "An African Perspective on Security." In *U.S. Strategy in Africa.* edited by David J. Francis. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Shriver, Sargent. "The Peace Corps Strength." In *The Peace Corps*, edited by Pauline Madow, 20-25. New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1964.

Shriver, Sargent. *The Point of the Lance.* New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Spiegel, Avi, "Send in the Peace Corps," *NYTIMES.com,* July, 23, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/ 2003/07/23/opinion/send-in-the-peace-corps.html. (Accessed 20 Dec 2010).

Unicef.org. http://www.unicef.org/sowc96pk/hidekill.htm. (Accessed 10 Jan 2011).

U.S. Africa Command Website. "Bush Discusses Goal of Africom." Feb 20 2008. http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1651. (Accessed 10 Mar 2010).

U.S. Agency for International Development Website, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/index.html. (Accessed 12 Jan 2011).

U.S. Agency for International Development. *Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy.* Washington DC: USAID. July, 2008.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Assessing the Safety and Security of Peace Corps Volunteers.* 108th Cong., 2d sess., June 22, 2004.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs. *The Peace Corps.* 107th Cong. 2nd Sess., June 25, 2002.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Stability Operations.* Directive 3000.05, September 16, 2009.

U. S. General Counsel. *The Peace Corps Act.* Passed on April 15, 1998.

U.S. Peace Corps Office of Safety and Security. *Safety of the Volunteer 2008.* Washington, DC: Peace Corps Headquarters, 2008. http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/volsafety2008.pdf. (Accessed 17 Dec 2010).

U.S. Peace Corps. *Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2010.* Washington, DC: Peace Corps Headquarters, 2010. http://multimedia.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/annrept2010.pdf. (Accessed 15 Dec 2010)